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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL 
VoLUME VII SUMMER, 1953 NUMBER 3 
OPERATION OF THE MEXICAN LABOR LAW* 
{Part I of Two Parts) 
Joseph M. Cormack** 
l. INTRODUCTORY 
THE purpose of this article is to examine the practical opera~ tion of the Mexican labor law. 
For a reader interested in either labor problems or compara-
tive law the Mexican labor law offers a particularly stimulating 
field of study. The Revolution of 1910, which deposed Diaz from 
his forty-year rule, was a social and economic as well as a politi-
cal revolution, and stirrings among labor were a basic factor in 
the causes giving rise to it. The Mexican labor law has since 
developed in the presence of a dominant ideological viewpoint 
well to the left of any which has ever prevailed in the United 
States. In the labor field Mexico has taken forward steps before 
they have been taken in this country. Judging the future by the 
*The research upon which this article is based was made possible in part through 
a grant-in-aid from the Social Science Research Council and a grant-in-aid allocated 
by the research committee at the College of William and Mary from funds made avail-
able jointly by the Carnegie Foundation and the College. The author, however, and 
not the College, the Council or the Foundation, is solely responsible for the statements 
made in this article. 
Many courtesies extended by Pierre Macy and J. D. Carter, of the Modern Languages 
Department of the College of William and Mary, are gratefully acknowledged, likewise 
the efficient assistance in research of Mrs. Helen L. Clagett, head of the Latin American 
Section of the Law Library of the Library of Congress. Work in Mexico City was facili-
tated by an office furnished in the Social and Economic Unit Building of the American 
Embassy and many copies of the Embassy Digest of newspapers, supplied by Mrs. 
Eistetter of the Embassy staff. 
• *Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary in Virginia. 
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past, one who desires to know what may happen m the United 
States should know what is happening in Mexico. 
Since the revolution there has been great interest in labor prob-
lems in Mexico, and in political and governmental matters Mexico 
is the leading Latin American country in its influence upon the 
others. In both Mexico and the United States, as is no doubt true 
in other portions of the world, labor problems seem destined to 
be of increasingly greater importance. Currents of thought are 
stirring in Mexico from which we may learn much. 
As the Mexican jurists grapple with the difficult problems in 
this field, we are afforded an excellent opportunity to observe the 
workings of the minds of civil law scholars with training, tempera-
ment, and methods of approach very different from our own. 
All labor relations throughout Mexico are controlled by the 
national government, rather than by the states.1 The federal statute 
now in force, based upon the Constitution of 1917, is known as 
the Labor Law of 1931. It is comprehensive in scope, and so 
nearly resembles our federal act that the reader can assume that 
the provisions .of the two laws are the same, except insofar as dif-
ferences are pointed out later herein. Translations of the law into 
English are readily available for those who desire to go into it 
further. I participated in an exposition in English of the contents 
of the law, together with a touch of the tragic historical back-
ground.2 
1 Until 1929 the Constitution gave the national Congress and the Legislatures of the 
states concurrent jurisdiction to pass labor laws (not in conflict with the numerous 
constitutional provisions) founded upon the necessities of each region. In that year the 
jurisdiction of the states was removed, and the federal government was empowered to 
enact a labor law of national application. Article 73 (10) of the Constitution and the 
preamble to Article 123 were amended. Decree of August 31, 1929, Diario Oficial, Sep-
tember 6, 1929. 
2 Cormack & Barker, The Mexican Labor Law, 7 So. Calif. L. Rev. 251 (1934-). For 
more comprehensive historical treatment consult: CLARK, ORGANIZED LABOR IN MEXICO 
(1934-); MARIO DE LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 194-9), esp. v. 
1, cc. 2-7, and v. 2, cc. 38-4-3; GRUEN lNG, MEXICO AND ITS HERITAGE (1928); PRIESTLY, 
THE MEXICAN NATION, A HISTORY (1930); TANNENBAUM, MEXICO: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
PEACE AND BREAD (1950); ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, EvoLUCION DE LA HuELGA 1950). 
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The consideration herein of the operation of the law will in-
clude the decisions of the courts interpreting it and applying it to 
various situations. In addition to examining the Mexican legal 
literature and court decisions, I made personal observations in 
Mexico, and attended courses in labor law at the University of 
Mexico. An effort will be made to present the governmental, politi-
cal, and sociological milieu in which the labor law operates- it 
is only in the light of this that the effectiveness of any social 
institution can be judged. In order to present a living picture, the 
footnotes contain many references to Mexican newspapers. 
The first two topics - profit-sharing and discharge of workers 
-have been selected for special emphasis because of the possibil-
ity of their great importance in the future development of labor 
law in Mexico and the United States, and because they afford a 
particularly good opportunity to observe the mental processes and 
points of view of the Mexican jurists and the course of their his-
torical progress. These subjects are unique in the Mexican law, in 
the sense that they have received a great deal of attention in 
Mexico, and have been relatively unthought of in this country. It 
is in connection with these aspects of the law that it seems most 
likely that we shall be able to learn from the Mexicans, and that 
it will be most important for us to observe the future course of 
their development. The two topics will therefore be developed in 
considerable detail. The reader who does not have a detailed 
interest in them from the standpoints mentioned should pass on to 
the later more generally treated topics. 
2. PROFIT-SHARING 
The potentialities of this part of labor law are tremendous.8 It 
8 Consult, in general: ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ, LA PARTICIPACION EN LAS UTILIDADES Y 
EL SALARIO EN MEXICO (1935); 1 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO 
(3d ed. 1949) 700; GUILLERMO MoLINA REYES, LA PARTICIPACION A Los 0BREROS EN 
LAS BENEFICIOS DE LAS EMPRESAS Y LAS ACCIONES DE TRABAJO DE LAS SOCIEDADES 
ANONIMAS (1943); JUAN TREVINO z., LA PARTICIPACION DE LAS UTILIDADES EN EL 
DERECHO DEL TRABAJO MEXICANO (1943). 
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offers a way to put an end to all labor law, by making it unnec-
essary. The only way t~ end struggles between labor and capital 
would seem to be to cause each to feel that it is getting a fair 
share of the profits.4 If this can be done, they will then feel that 
they are working together as partners.5 It is therefore interesting, 
and may prove to be of great importance to the rest of the world~ 
that Mexico is apparently going to make a serious effort to estab-
lish profit-sharing as a principle of universal application.6 
The prevalence of corporate income taxes may yield a valuable 
by-product here. One of the greatest objections to profit-sharing 
has been that it would be impossible to tell what the profits are.7 
It would seem that the profits as determined for tax purposes could 
be used as the basis for profit-sharing. 
• Of course, current payments to workers in the form of a minimum wage have to 
be provided. By like reasoning it is conceivable that labor could be brought to see the 
justice of a corresponding minimum return upon the original investment of capital, to 
be carried along as a cumulative deferred charge before any distribution (beyond the 
minimum mentioned) of profits to labor. 
6 Opposed to this, organized employers have said that profit.sharing would be "one 
more reason for conflicts between capital and labor." "Oposici6n Patronal a Ia Partici· 
paci6n," Mexico City Excelsior, September 21, 1951, p. 19A. 
6 Various methods of distributing the profits have been suggested. The most natural 
would seem to be for each business to make payments to its employees in the same 
manner that dividends are paid to stockholders (possibly substituting cash for checks). 
It has been suggested that profits should be distributed to workers through the issuance 
of stock, instead of cash payments. This would seem to offer too many complications to 
be feasible, even though "labor shares" are recognized in the corporation laws. The 
same objection applies to suggestions that the profits of each business should be placed 
in a common fund, to be administered by the workers through majority vote. It has 
also been suggested that the workers' share of the profits should be turned over to the 
government, to be administered by it in various ways for the benefit of the workers of 
the entire country. This turns profit·sharing into a social security tax upon employers, 
and offers no incentive to workers to make the particular business more successful than 
its competitors. Another proposal has been that the profits from all businesses through· 
out the country be placed in a national fund, with uniform payments to all workers 
throughout the country. This again removes any incentive to advance the fortunes of 
the particular enterprise as compared with others. Unless the workers receive their 
payments in the same way that stockholders do, they will not feel that they are sharing 
in the profits. As to methods of distribution, see: ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ, LA PARTICI· 
PACI6N EN LAS UTILIDADES Y EL SALARIO EN MEXICO (1935) 83, 95, 106, 109, 183; 
GUILLERMO MoLINA REYES, LA PARTICIPACI6N A LOS 0BREROS EN LOS BENEFICIOS DE 
LAS EMPRESAS v LAS AcciONEs DE TRABAJO DE LAS SociEDADES AN6NIMAS (1943) 35, 
49·80. 
7 ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ, LA PARTICIPACI6N EN LAS UTILIDADES Y EL SALARIO EN 
MExiCO (1935) 128 ff., esp. 136, 160, 167. 
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Prominent in the Constitution of 1917 is the famous Article 
123,8 which has been termed the first charter of social rights in 
the world.9 It sets forth a long series of provisions and guaranties 
for the protection of labor. It states (italics inserted) : 
Congress, with due regard for the following principles, shall enact 
laws on labor, which shall govern in the case of skilled and unskilled 
workmen, employees, domestic help, and artisans, and in general every 
labor contract: 
* * * * * 
(VI) ... In all agricultural, commercial, manufacturing or mmmg 
enterprises, the workman shall have the right to participate in the 
profits in the manner set forth in Subdivision IX of this Article. 
* * * * * 
(IX) The fixing .•. of the participation in profits .•. shall be carried 
out by special commissions appointed in each municipality and subor· 
dinate to the central board of conciliation and arbitration established 
in each state. 
As the federal government did not proceed to take any steps to 
appoint the commissions, or otherwise endeavor to make the con· 
stitutional provisions as to profits effective, 10 several of the states 
s It is an interesting sidelight that one of the principal streets in downtown Mexico 
City is named Article 123 (Articulo 123) Street. 
9 Mexico City Excelsior, October 13, 19<W, p. 23, discussing meeting of the Academy 
of Law and Social Security (Academia de Derecho y Prevision Social), presided over 
by the distinguished labor jurist, Member of Congress and union attorney, Alberto 
Trueba Urbina, whose works will be frequently referred to in this article, and whose lec-
tures I attended at the law school of the University of Mexico. Professor Manuel Marvan 
made the same comment in his labor law course at that school. Trueba is the leader 
of the labor group in the Chamber of Deputies. 
to In 1919 the Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress passed a bill (which 
did not become law) providing that in territories under federal control from 10 to 
30 per cent of profits should be distributed. In 1921 President Obregon felt that it was 
not possible to give effect to the constitutional provisions, because of the difficulty in 
determining the amount of profits, and because, if determined, there would arise con-
stant struggle between capital and labor. In 1925 the Chamber of Deputies passed 
another profit-sharing bill which did not become law. JuAN TREVINO Z., LA PARTICI· 
PACION DE LAS UTILIDADES EN EL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO MEXICANO (1943) 49, 50. Presi-
dent Cardenas, in a presidential message in 1935, advocated profit-sharing. ALBERTO 
BREMAUNTZ, LA PARTICIPACION EN LAS UTJLIDADES y EL SALARIO EN MEXICO (1935) 
100; JuAN TREVINO Z., op. cit. supra, at 57. 
In 1929 (the present Labor Law being enacted in 1931) a Labor Law proposed by 
President Gil, but not enacted, provided that each worker should receive by reason of 
profits [presumably if any] an amount equal to five per cent of his monthly salary. 
GusTAvo AacE CANO, LAs JuNTAS DE CoNCILIACION Y DE CoNcruAcr6N Y ARBITRAJE 
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made ineffectual attempts to do so.11 The resulting situation has 
been described as follows: 
For several years after the adoption of the Constitution of 1917 the 
profit-sharing clause in Article 123 caused many conflicts between labor 
and capital. But this part of the Article was never made effective. 
Veracruz, in 1921, attempted to give workers some share in profits, 
by passing the "Hunger Law" which provided that each year not less 
than 10% [nor more than 90% ]12 of the net profits of the business 
should be turned over to the workers. Employers' associations were up 
in arms and threatened closure of the important manufacturing estab-
lishments of the state if the law were enforced. The federal government 
consistently used its influence against workers' participation in profits 
and the unions in later years [written in 1934] have made no claims 
for profit sharing.l3 
(1938) 72. The same year the Congress declared that in the Social Security Law to 
be enacted provision would be made for use of the workers' share of profits as part of the 
social security fund. Codigo Portes Gil, quoted, ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ, op. cit. supra, at 
72, 73. See also: ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ, op. cit. supra, at 67, 69; GUILLERMO MoLINA 
REYES, LA PARTICIPACION A LOS 0BREROS EN LOS B.ENEFICIOS DE LAS EMPRESAS Y LAS 
AcciONES DE TRABAlJo DE LAS SociEDADES ANoNIMAS (1943) 43. 
11 The constitutionality of state laws in regard to profits (during the period of state 
jurisdiction) was upheld by the national Supreme Court. Amp. Tomas Ruiz & Cia., 
16 S. J. F. 1276 (1925-1926, decision 1925). 
"Amp." will be used as abbreviation for "Amparo de" (Appeal of). In common law 
practice the party named would be the appellant. Under civil law theory an amparo is 
an appeal for justice against the action of an inferior governmental authority, rather 
than a continuation of the contest with the adversary litigant as such. 
"S. J. F." is the standard Mexican abbreviation for Semanario Judicial Federal 
(Federal Judicial Weekly), an official publication reporting the text of Supreme Court 
decisions. If the decision is from an earlier year than that in which the volume was 
published, both dates will be shown. 
"Cia." is the abbreviation for company (compafiia). 
12 GusTAvo ARcE CANO, LAs JuNTAS DE CoNCILIACION Y DE CoNCILIACION Y 
ARBITRAJE (1938) 71. 
18 CLARK, ORGANIZED LABOR IN MEXICO 0934) 227, quoted by permission of the 
University of North Carolina Press. An earlier Veracruz law, in 1918, had provided 
that each worker should be paid at the end of each year, as his share of the profits 
[presumably if any earned], an amount equal to his pay for one month. /d. at 53. 
In Chihuahua and Campeche the share in profits was to be from 5 to 10 per cent, 
in the latter state this being limited to a percentage of annual profits exceeding 20 per 
cent of the invested capital. In Guanajuato the right to participate in profits was given 
to workers who had not been absent more than five times during a month and whose 
monthly salary exceeded 200 pesos. In most businesses 50 per cent of the profits were 
to be paid to employees of all kinds. These and other state laws are discussed: GusTAVO 
ARCE CANO, LAs JuNTAS DE CoNCILIACION v DE CoNciLIACioN Y ARBITRAJE (1938) 71; 
ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ, LA p ARTICIPACION EN LAS UTILIDADES Y EL SALARIO EN MEXICO 
(1935) 66, 69, 107; GUILLERMO MOLINA REYES, LA PARTICIPACION A LOS 0BREROS EN 
LOS BENEFICIOS DE LAS EMPRESAS Y LAS ACCIONES DE TRABAJO DE LAS SOCIEDADES 
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The national Supreme Court has consistently held that the con-
stitutional provisions are not self-executing/4 and that until the 
commissions are appointed the workers cannot require that they 
he given a share of the profits.16 In view of the reference in the 
Constitution to the commissions, this result seems unavoidable, 
notwithstanding a general provision that the bases of Article 123 
are to go into effect at once.16 Like ourselves, the Mexicans have 
the principle of jurisprudence that a special provision controls a 
general one.17 
The constitutional provlSlon for profit-sharing has been criti-
cized because it provides for the apportionment of profits by local 
ANONIMAS (1943) 41; JUAN TREVINO Z., LA PARTICIPACION EN LAS UTILlDADES EN EL 
DERECHO DEL TRABAJO MEXICANO (1943) 49, 50. 
President Gil ascribed the failure of the state laws to two factors: the lack of well 
prepared commissions; and difficulties in examining the records of businesses and deter-
mining the profits. Quoted, BREMAUNTZ, op. cit. supra, at 71. 
H The failure to make effective provision for the participation in profits in the 
Constitution when originally adopted can probably be attributed to haste in the Consti· 
tutional Convention. While there had earlier been some discussion of labor matters, 
"it was not until ..• a week before the closing of the congress, that the project of 
Article 123 was introduced. Then, in only two sessions, one in the afternoon and the 
other in the evening of that day, the article was discussed and adopted. Thus, hastily, 
was prepared the basis for future labor legislation in Mexico. Both labor and capital 
are still suffering the effects of the haste and lack of preparation in social theory of 
the Queretaro congress." CLARK, ORGANIZED LABOR IN MEXICO (1934) 49, quoted by 
permission of the University of North Carolina Press. 
15 Amp. Cerveceria Moctezuma, S.A., 12 S.J.F. 753, 757 (1923); Amp. Maldonado 
Antonia, 71 S.J.F. 3257, 3262 (1942); Albamin v. Presidente, 73 S. J. F. 1281, 1345 
(1942). Other Supreme Court decisions are cited and quoted: ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ, 
LA PARTICIPACION EN LAS UTILIDADES y EL SALARIO EN MExiCO (1935) 120; GUILLERMO 
MoLINA REYES, LA PARTICIPACION A LOS 0BREROS EN LOS BENEFICIOS DE LAS EMPRESAS 
Y LAS AcciONES DE TRABAIJO DE LAS SociEDADES AN6NIMAS (1943) 45; JuAN TREVINO 
Z., LA PARTICIPATION DE LAS UTILIDADES EN EL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO M.ExiCANO 
(1943) 52. 
16 Transitory Article 11 of the Constitution reads: "Until the national Congress 
and those of the states legislate upon the agrarian and labor problems, the bases estab-
lished in this Constitution for such laws shall be in force throughout the country." 
In reference to possible entry of declaratory judgments in favor of workers (which 
would seem to have no practical value), pending establishment of the commissions, 
see Amp. Bengochea Francisco, 46 S.J.F. 3502, 3513 (1937, decision 1935); Amp. 
Celorio Eulogio y coags., August 12, 1936, quoted: GUILLERMO MoLINA REYES, LA 
PARTICIPACION A LOS 0BREROS ,EN LOS BENEFICIOS DE LAS EMPRESAS Y LAS AcCIONES DE 
TRABAJO DE LAS SociEDADES ANONIMAS (1943) 47. And see digests of cases: 7 Revista 
Mexicana del Trabajo (1936, Nums. 39 y 40) 164; id. (Nums. 41 y 42) 288; 10 id. 
(1938) 255-257. 
17 3 ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, DERECHO PROCESAL DEL TRABAJO (1943) 449-the 
special provision is the exception to the general. 
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commissions, subject only to control by the particular state.18 Such 
a system is certain to result in serious discriminations between 
employers doing business in different p~rts of the country/9 and 
to create difficulties for enterprises doing business in more than 
one state. It seems clear that the constitution should be amended 
to provide for action upon a national scale, with authority to make 
local adjustments.20 
In view of the importance attached to profit-sharing by the 
Mexican workers, it seems certain that eventually an obligatory 
system will be put into effect,21 notwithstanding the opposition of 
18 GusTAVO ARcE CANO, LAs JuNTAs DE CoNCILIACION Y DE CoNCILIACION y ARBI· 
TRAJE (1938) 74. He suggests the appointment of a council of employers and workers 
in each line of business. Such councils have already been set up for other purposes, in 
many instances, under the terms of union contracts with employers- for example: 
"Comisi6n de Vigilancia," Mexico City Excelsior, November 13, 1950, p. 25. 
While the work cited is a thesis submitted to the law school of the University of 
Mexico, in dealing with Mexican law a thesis can be cited without apology. A visitor 
to Mexico is startled at the high quality of the theses, and the consideration given them 
by mature scholars. This is in part a reflection of the great attention given to research 
at the law school. There are a number of well·equipped and diligently used seminar 
rooms with specialized libraries and with a faculty member present for consultation 
several hours a day. 
19 It would be contrary to the Mexican law for an employer to move his plant from 
one state to another in order to take advantage of more favorable labor laws. However, 
this portion of the law has little practical effect, as the employer can evade it by dis· 
charging all the workers in the old plant and paying them the required indemnity, to he 
discussed infra under "Discharge of Workers." 
2o 1 MARIO DE LA CuEVA, D.ERECHo MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 708. 
Another writer has suggested commissions for specified areas, with a central coordinat· 
ing authority. ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ, LA PARTICIPATION EN LAS UTILIDADES Y EL SALARJO 
EN MEXICO (1935) 135. 
If it were felt to he feasible to provide statutory requirements as to the percentage 
of profits to be distributed, and income tax returns were used as the basis, commissions 
would be unnecessary. /d. at 167. However, distinctions involving the consideration 
of many varying factors will no doubt be required, and it would be difficult to accom· 
plish this by a general law. A great electric power plant may require only a handful 
of workers, whereas a window washing company may require many workers but little 
capital. Some businesses will be much more hazardous and fluctuating than others. 
Some will require large investments of capital for years before any returns can be 
expected. 
21 Congressional Deputies belonging to the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institu· 
cional submitted to the President a technical and legal study to be used as a basis for 
framing legislation, with support from the opposition Partido Acci6n Nacional. 
"Participaci6n Para los Trabajadores," Mexico City Excelsior, September 24, 1950, 
p. 1. Profit.sharing was a leading subject of discussion and favorable action at the 
national union convention in 1950 of the great C. T. M. ( Confederaci6n de Trabajadores 
de Mexico). In this connection the jurist Trueba affirmed that it is necessary that the 
class struggle be not abandoned while there are multitudes of unprotected persons. 
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the employers.22 In the 1951 May Day parade of half a million 
workers in Mexico City, there were many more placards dealing 
with this than with any other subject.23 
The present support of profit-sharing by the unions is a rever-
sal of their former opposition. They then felt that any such system 
would be counter-revolutionary, that is, contrary to the class strug-
gle, in that it would turn the workers into capitalists.24 Now the 
thought is being advanced that turning them into capitalists as 
"Insiste Ia CTM que los Obreros Tengan Participaci6n en las Utilidades," id., July 5, 
1950, p. 18. 
Without waiting for action by the Congress, the unions are demanding profit-sharing 
clauses in their contracts. "La CROM Insistira en el Reparto de Utilidades Para los 
Trabajadores," id., June 27, 1950, p. 4; "Participaci6n de las Utilidades," id., December 
14, 1950, p. 1; "Peticiones Cetemistas," id., February 13, 1951, p. 23. Such a provision 
appears in the union contract with Fabricas de Papel de San Rafael y Anexas, for 
example. 1 MARIO DE LA CuEVA, D.ERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 710. 
Section 602 of the Labor Law recognizes participation in profits as a proper feature 
<~f a labor contract. 
Of course, profits are at least a negative factor in every determination of a wage 
rate. Trueba lays down as a basic principle identifying a proper strike, that "when the 
employer makes a greater gain, the pay of the worker should be increased," and points 
<~ut that this principle has been approved by the Supreme Court. AI,.BERTO TRUEBA 
URBINA, Evowc16N DE LA HuELGA (1950) 137, quoting Amp. Union Sindical de 
Peluqueros, Ejecutoria de September 20, 1935. 
22 J. }ESUS CASTORENA, TRATADO DE DER~HO 0BRERO (1942) 783; 1 MARIO DE LA 
CuEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 707. The employers' federa· 
tion feels that any system of profit-sharing should be voluntary. "EI Reparto de las 
Utilidades, Dificil," Mexico City Excelsior, July 1, 1951, p. 1A. They object to making 
their financial operations public. "La CROM Insistira en el Reparto de Utilidades 
Para Los Trabajadores," id., June 27, 1950, p. 4. Other objections are set forth: 
"Oposici6n Patronal a la Participaci6n," id., September 21, 1951, p. 19A. 
2a This report was made by Justice Jorge Bocobo, head of the Code Commission 
<~f the Philippines, an eyewitness. 
24 1 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 706; 
Lie. Alfonso Melo Guzman, La Participacion de Utilidades a los Trabajadores, Mexico 
City Excelsior, May 5, 1951, p. 7 A; editorial, "Participaci6n de Utilidades," id., Decem· 
her 15, 1950, p. 6. In the editorial Pope Leo XIII is referred to as taking the lead in 
advancement of the idea in the present-day world. 
In 1921 the Mexico City Excelsior discussed in an editorial the opposition of the 
workers to the Veracruz state profit-sharing law. The workers were opposing profit. 
sharing upon the ground that it would deprive them of their liberty to fight for higher 
wages and shorter hours- they had the employers at their mercy, but under the new 
system the employers would compel them to work harder for the same wages in order 
to produce profits. The editor felt that this attitude reflected the influence of the Russian 
revolution. "La Participaci6n en las Utilidades," reprinted August 2, 1951, p. 7 A, from 
editorial "El Fracaso del Programs," id., July 27, 1921. 
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well as workers will provide a bulwark against communism.25 On 
the other hand, employers charged, some years ago, that compul-
sory profit-sharing would be socialistic and Bolshevik, and argued 
that the extra money would not do the workers any permanent 
good, as they would quickly squander it on pleasures and vices.26 
In favor of profit-sharing, the points have been made that when 
prices rise (inflation being a perpetual problem) the entire benefit 
should not go to the employer, and that the value in the market 
of the product of a business is produced by society rather than 
by the participants. 27 Also the point has been made that economic 
cycles would be lessened in intensity through more equitable dis-
tribution of the gains of business. 28 
Possibly it is fitting to let the Mexican jurist Bustillos29 close 
our discussion of this topic: 
It is indubitable that the participation of the workers in the profits of 
the employer would be the means of reconciling peacefully the conflict-
25 "Medida Para que no Cunda el Comunismo," Mexico City Excelsior, January 1, 
1951, p. 1; editorial, "Participaci6n de Utilidades," id., September 25, 1950, p. 6. The 
editor states that until a short time ago the tendency toward profit-sharing seemed very 
dangerous, and leading in the direction of communist objectives, but he feels that 
under present conditions it could, if well directed, be just the opposite. 
An earlier editorial in the same paper was skeptical, believing that profit-sharing 
would not only fail to be a panacea for the problems of the employers and the workers, 
but would not even result in betterment of the condition of the workers. Questions were 
raised as to how to deal with fluctuations of profits, and it was suggested that the idea 
merited conscientious study in order to be sure that it would not redound to the 
prejudice of the workers. "Utilidades a los Trabajadores," April 15, 1950, p. 6. 
26 Statement of Confederaci6n Fabril Nacional Mexicano, quoted: ALBERTO 
BREMAUNTZ, LA PARTICIPACION EN LAS UTILIDADES Y EL SALARIO EN MEXICO (1935) 191. 
27 ENRIQUE MARTiNEZ SoBRAL, PniNCIPIOS DE ENCONoMfA, quoted at length: ALBERTO 
BREMAUNTZ, LA PARTICIPACION EN LAS UTILIDADES y EL SALARIO EN MEXICO (1935) 191. 
JUAN TREVINO Z., LA PARTICIPACION DE LAS UTILIDADES EN EL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO 
MEXICANO (1934) 54. 
28 Statement of Department of Agriculture quoted: ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ, LA 
PARTICIPACION EN LAS UTILIDADES Y EL SALARIO EN Mfxrco (1935) 53. The ideas of 
Carlos L. Gracidas, prime mover of the adoption by the Constitutional Convention of 
the principle of profit-sharing, are set forth at length in letter quoted: ALBERTO 
BREMAUNTZ, op. cit. supra, at ll5. For other opinions pro and con: id. at 51, 56, 93, 96, 
189; GUILLERMO MOLINA REY.ES, LA PARTICIPACION A LOS 0BREROS EN LOS BENEFICIOS 
DE LAS EMPRESAS Y LAS ACCIONES DE TRABAJO DE LAS SOCIEDADES ANONIMAS (1943) 
37; JUAN TREVINO Z., LA PARTICIPACION DE LAS UTILIDADES EN EL D.ERECHO DEL 
TRABAJO MEXICANO (1943) 54. 
29 Lie. Jose R. Bustillos Carrillo, "Naturaleza y Estimativa Juridicas de la Partici-
paci6n en las Utilidades," 32 Revista del Trabajo 63, 65 (1948). 
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ing claims of capital and labor upon equitable bases, in such a way 
that the workers could be confident that they would really receive the 
wage which corresponds to the real worth of their work, involving a 
recognition of the right of the worker to the honest product of his 
labor, which would attain, as Smedley Taylor says, "a noteworthy sta· 
bility and a beneficent peace which are greatly lacking in employer· 
worker relationships." 
Attorney Mariano Alcocer feels that it should be considered highly 
commendable for employers to associate their personnel with them in 
the benefits of the enterprise, for the following reasons: 
(a) From the standpoint of equity the workers should share in the 
gains of an enterprise, because obtaining profits depends more upon 
economic conditions than upon the ability of the employers; 
(b) From the standpoint of the interest of the employers them-
selves, who would make a greater success of the enterprise by creating 
interest upon the part of the workers, as it is logical to believe that 
when they feel that they have a right to participate in the profits of 
the enterprise in which they are rendering their service, they will dis· 
play greater activity, with the purpose of increasing production; 
(c) Because of the harmony which this method of remunerating 
the labor force would maintain in the employer-worker relations; and 
(d) Because the system could be considered a step toward a more 
perfect organization of production. 
The adversaries of the system make the following objections: 
First. That the plan is not equitable insofar as it associates the 
workers only with the profits of an enterprise, and excludes them from 
the losses. 
Bustillos feels that the answer to this is that the workers will 
have invested their labor (in the hope of being duly compensated 
out of the profits) in the same manner as the capital of the em-
ployer, so that when losses come the worker will also be losing 
his patrimony. Smedley Taylor is quoted to the effect that ordi-
narily a large percentage of the profits placed in the treasury of 
the enterprise will have been due to the efforts of the workers, 
and that this money can with great justice be considered the con-
tribution of the workers to the future losses of the bad years. 
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The second objection is: 
In order that the workers could be sure that the participation assigned 
to them is trustworthy, they would have to have the accounts of the 
enterprise audited, which would involve a danger, inasmuch as within 
a short time the public would have knowldege of the economic state of 
the business. 
Bustillos replies to this by pointing out that most corporations 
now make public the results of their operations, without having 
experienced unfavorable consequences. Furthermore, he asserts 
that good faith in dealing with the workers entitles them to this 
knowledge. 
The third objection is: 
The right to participation would cause the workers to endeavor to 
intervene in the direction of the enterprise whenever they believed, 
with or without reason, that the management of the employer was 
mistaken, and this interference could reduce the profits. 
Bustillos feels, in reply, that the interest of the workers in the 
management of the business would be beneficial rather than in-
jurious, and that, with their intimate knowledge of its functioning, 
they would have ideas which would increase profits. Also, he is 
of the opinion that if a right upon the part of the workers to share 
in the profits is recognized, it would not be consonant with such 
right to bar them from objecting to the adoption of improper 
methods. Bustillos adds that he does not advocate making the 
participation in profits permanent, as this would involve too great 
a restriction upon the development of the enterprise. 
The fourth and final objection is: 
No institution is taken seriously when it is "founded on charity and 
benevolence". 
Bustillos feels that profit-sharing is not a charity, but rather a 
just distribution of a common product, and points out that the 
right has already been given recognition in the Mexican Constitu-
tion. He concludes: 
Undoubtedly there are other objections to the system, and we do not 
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aspire to demonstrate that it would remedy all the ills which appear in 
employer-worker relations. It would, however, conduce to a better dis-
tribution of the product of the joint efforts, and would thus become a 
factor of co-operation and necessary stability as well as of a social 
peace based on justice. Its aspirations are limited "to transferring, 
peacefully and with satisfaction to both parties, millions of pesos from 
the treasury of the employer to the stockings of the workers". 
3. DISCHARGE oF WoRKERS 
A key issue in labor relations is control over the discharge of 
workers. The disadvantages to the employer, if he cannot be mas-
ter in his own house, are obvious. 80 A Mexican jurist, Supreme 
Court Justice Luis G .. Corona, contends31 that any limitation upon 
the right of an employer to discharge workers32 is a violation of 
constitutional individual guaranties, because, insofar as it is effec-
tive, it deprives the employer of the power to manage his own 
business, and condemns him to a perpetual tie to his workers, unless 
he wishes to turn his capital over to them. Justice Corona states 
that -it creates an atmosphere of violence, leaving the weapons in 
the hands of the worker, with the employer helpless. 
A labor spokesman, union official and Congressman, Fernando 
Amilpa, has expressed33 the viewpoint of the workers: 
Apart from the technical aspects of the question, ... it involves a 
fundamentally human content: to guarantee the rights which are the 
patrimony of the worker as an active member of society and as an 
3° For objections of employers: GRUPO PATRONAL DE LA REPUBLICA, 0BSERVACIONES 
Y SUGESTIONES DEL GRUPO PATRONAL AL PROYECTO DE LEY FEDERAL DEL TRABAJO (1931) 
25, 39. See also 3 Anexos to PROYECTO DEL C6DIGO FEDERAL DEL TRABAJO, CON LOS 
CoMENTARIOS Y SucESTIONES HEcHos AL MisMo POR LA CoMISION NoMBRADA POR LAS 
AsociACIONES PATRONALES (1931): Num. 1, Memorandum Sobre la Conveniencia de 
Modificar el Articulo 123 de la Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Me:xicanos, 
p. 3; Num. 6, Maximiliano Camiro, Memorandum Sobre la Terminaci6n del Contrato 
de Trabajo Celebrado por Tiempo lndefinido, pp. 1-9; Num. 9, Maximiliano Camiro, 
Memorandum Sobre Legislaci6n del Trabajo en los Estados Unidos Me:xicanos, pp. 
11, 12. 
81 Reported: "Reforma a! 123 que es Anticonstitucional," Mexico City Excelsior, 
November 26, 1948, p. 20. 
82 He evidently does not feel that the requirement of a severance payment, which 
already exists, constitutes a limitation. 
88 Radio broadcast, reported: "La Reforma a Ia Fracci6n XXI del Articulo 123 
Protege los Derechos de los Obreros," Mexico City Excelsior, December 17, 1948, p. 3. 
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important factor in the economic development of business enterprises. 
From this it results that it is anachronous and artificial for employers 
to claim that protection of workers against unjustified discharge would 
involve a lessening of the liberty of the employers and would foment 
employer-worker frictions. 
It is inexact to say that an unjustified discharge is resolved satisfac-
torily and definitively for both parties through the medium of the pay· 
ment of indemnity [as is now required]. For the employer it means an 
extra expense of a small amount; but for the worker it is only a 
transitory solution, while the cents last which he has received and 
which he exhausts in the satisfaction of his huge necessities and those 
of his family. But, further, a trained worker- if we assume such a 
case- cannot quickly find employment in his particular line; and to 
train himself for another line requires newly initiated a~d redoubled 
efforts, lessening his economic possibilities; and we must not lose sight 
of the fact that the physical and moral aspects of the situation will de-
press him. To sum it all up, a worker unjustifiably discharged, al-
though indemnified, is converted into a charge upon society. All of 
this is without taking into account that the appearance of the dis· 
charge upon his record is a negative recommendation- silent but 
evident - so that one employer and another and yet another will 
take this into account and will not give him employment. In theory 
"black lists" [prohibited by the Labor Law34 ] do not exist; but we 
all know the reality insofar as many instances of employers' actions 
are concerned. 
... * * * * 
To protect the worker is simply an act of justice to one who does not 
have the economic strength sufficient to prevent his being made the 
victim of caprice. 
The great jurist De la Cueva, in the third edition of his large 
two-volume work on labor law,35 says: 
The workers' association has this goal, the permanent defense, present 
and future, of the worker; and nothing better translates into action 
this essence of the law of labor, than the Mexican principle of the 
permanence of the labor relation while the causes continue which gave 
rise to the origin and subject matter of the work [author's italics]. 
Upon the value which is given to these principles depend the present 
84 § 112 (7); 1 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 
612. 
85 1 MARIO DE LA CUEVA. DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 825. 
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and the future of the worker; the present, inasmuch as wages are, as 
the law states in Section 95, the basis of the worker's patrimony, and 
the future, because the years of service create a series of rights, to 
promotion, seniority, retirement, etc. 
Under the individualistic conception, in a business enterprise there 
exist only patrimonial relations between each worker and his em-
ployer, and the failure to fulfill any obligation is repaired through the 
payment of damages; the law of labor takes a different position, be-
cause the worker acquires rights in the enterprise that cannot be taken 
away. It is curious that men should exert themselves to surround 
capital with guaranties, and protest against any expropriation, and 
that, on the other hand, these same men should give their support 
to making it possible for the rights of workers to disappear through 
an arbitrary act of the owner of the business; and the difference is 
so much the more striking when the workers have in their favor a 
provision in the law (to be discussed in the text of this article] which 
is clear and precise. 
The battle for strict compliance with the labor contracts is one of the 
best evidences of the thesis sustained in this book: in the capitalist 
world there exist two hostile classes; because, if this is not so, how can 
the refusal of the employers to comply with the labor contracts be 
explained? Is it possible to conceive of a collaboration of classes 
which would have as one of its postulates the caprice of the employer? 
It will not be possible to achieve social peace if the rights of the 
workers are not fully respected. 
The Mexican labor law has been a determining factor in the evolution 
of the law of the peoples of South America; and it is sad to contem-
plate that while those peoples are advancing in the course which our 
institutions indicate, we are endeavoring to destroy them (the back-
ward step which he has in mind will be discussed]. 
* * * * * 
The Mexican workers, while the present principle of our Supreme 
Court prevails, have one way open to them, to demand that the clause 
of compulsory reinstatement be included in their collective contracts 
[author's italics]. And this solution is not alien to our law, as it is 
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found set forth in the collective contract of the railroads of 1936.36 
The Mexican law has had a curious history in reaching its pres· 
ent position, that any worker can be discharged, with or without 
reason, upon payment of the required indemnity. Subdivision 22 
of the famous Article 123 of the Constitution contains the follow-
ing provision, which by itself would clearly entitle a wrongfully 
discharged worker to obligatory reinstatement: 
An employer who discharges a worker without proper cause or for 
having joined a union or for having taken part in a lawful strike, shall 
be bound, at the option of the worker, either to perform the contract 
or to indemnify him by the payment of three months' wages. 
However, the preceding Subdivision 21 of the same Article 
provides for what would seem to be a remedy open to the worker 
at his election in another connection, or, as Trueba puts it,87 a 
general rule to which Subdivision 22 is an exception. The Subdi· 
vision reads: 
If the employer refuses to submit his differences to arbitration or to 
accept the award rendered by the Board, the labor contract shall be 
considered terminated, and the employer shall be bound to indemnify 
the worker by .the payment to him of three months' wages, in addition 
to the liability which he may have incurred by reason of the dispute. 
If the workman rejects the award, the contract will be held to have 
terminated. 
Putting the two Subdivisions together, it was at first the view of 
the Supreme Court that the worker could compel his reinstate-
ment. Later the court reversed itself, and held that he could not, 
upon the ground that to give him that right would constitute a 
86 He continues by pointing out the impersonal character of present-day production, 
and states that compulsory reinstatement should not apply to house servants or to 
other situations involving close personal contacts. 
The great jurist Trueba believes that the employer should be compelled to reinstate 
a wrongfully discharged employee, in order that the worker may permanently have the 
means of livelihood. He points out that a judgment for the reinstatement of a worker 
has characteristics different from those of any other civil obligation, and that the 
permanence of the worker in his employment has no equivalent in the life of society. 
3 .ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, DERECHO PROCESAL DEL TRABAJO (1943) 442. 
87 3 ALBERTO TRU.EBA URBINA, DERECHO PROCESAL DEL TRABAJO (1943) 449. 
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deprivation of liberty,88 in violation of Article 5 of the Constitu-
tion, the relevant part of which reads: 
The government can not permit the carrying into effect of any con-
tract, covenant or agreement having for its object the impairment, loss, 
or irrevocable sacrifice of the liberty of man, whether on account of 
work, education, or religious vow. 
De la Cueva, leading up to discussion of these decisions, 
states :39 
The individualistic idea of law has not been definitely discarded in the 
life of the labor law; and it has not been possible to make effective 
[the first quoted] Subdivision 22 of Article 123 of the Constitution. 
The employers have consistently refused to comply with judgments 
ordering them to reinstate workers unjustifiably discharged; two prin-
cipal arguments have been adduced: first, that Subdivision 21 of 
Article 123 of the Constitution, in harmony with Sections 601 and 602 
of the Labor Law [along the lines of Subdivision 21], authorizes the 
employer to refuse to submit to the arbitration of the Labor Boards 
and authorizes him not to obey the Board's order; such refusals cause 
the contract of employment to be considered broken, and impose upon 
the employer the obligation to pay the damages thereby caused. The 
second argument is that the obligation to reinstate is an obligation 
to take affirmative action ["hacer"], and that, upon failure to comply 
with it, it is transformed into an obligation to pay the resulting 
damages, as provided in Section 600 of the Labor Law [Section 600 
is like the quoted Subdivision 21]. 
De la Cueva then quotes at length from the earlier decision, in 
1938,40 in which the above arguments were rejected, and reinstate-
ment of the worker compelled. He next discusses the overruling 
of this decision: 
The new members of the Labor Division of the Supreme Court 
ss De Ia Cueva interprets the opinion as meaning that the employer would be de-
prived of liberty, which seems to be clear. 1 DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 
1949) 818. Trueba, however, giving the interpretation that the worker would be deprived 
of liberty, uses the adjectives "absurd" and "truly monstrous" in describing the 
opinion, and says: "To compare civil obligations with those of labor is simply to be 
ignorant of the incompatible nature of these obligations .•.• " 3 DERECHO PROCESAL DEL 
TRABAJO (1943) 449. 
ao 1 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 815. 
40 Amp. Gustavo Adolfo de la Selva, 49 S,J.F. 681 (1938). 
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changed the course of our jurisprudence, and, in Amparo de Oscar 
Cue, 67 S.J,F. 2044 ( 1941), uprooted from the Mexican labor law one 
of its greatest triumphs, upon the ground that the obligation of the 
employer is one to act ["hacer," rather than to pay], i.e., to furnish 
the employee with work, and that such an obligation can not he spe-
cifically enforced, hut when breached is transformed into one to pay 
the damages. Reliance was placed upon the Message of the President 
["Exposicion de Motivos"] when he transmitted the Labor Law to 
the Congress. The decision also reasoned: the constitutional provisions 
in Subdivisions 21 and 22 "cannot be applied to conflicts which are 
of an economic character and of an order distinct from the individual 
struggle between the master and the workers. It is neither admissible 
nor convenient, on the other hand, that when the parties are separated 
from each other by reasons which may be numerous and grave, they 
continue, nevertheless, in an enforced relation which would prejudice 
the equilibrium and harmony which should exist between capital and 
labor for production. Finally, apart from how unsound juridically and 
even monstrous it would he to exercise violence in connection with 
obligations to take affirmative action, reinstatement as the result of a 
lawsuit would be equivalent to considering the worker a lifetime func-
tionary ["vitalicio"], which would lead to the extremes condemned 
by the Fifth Article of the Constitution, which prohibits carrying into 
effect any contract, covenant, or agreement having for its object the 
impairment or irrevocable sacrifice of the liberty of man, whether 
caused by work, education or religious vow." 
The court also felt that it would be impossible to enforce the obli-
gations of the employer. 
De la Cueva severely criticizes the opinion, feeling that the 
court is protecting the employer rather than the worker. He cites 
the views of Continental writers that a worker can be given pro-
tection against wrongful discharge without violation of the natural 
rights of man. 
De la Cueva makes the clever, though possibly specious, argu-
ment that the obligation of the employer, if reinstatement is 
ordered, is not one on his part to take affirmative action, since, 
while the obligation of the worker is to expend his energy in his 
work, the only obligation upon the employer is to pay - he does 
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not have to furnish work- because, while he is privileged to 
make use of the services of the worker whom he pays, he is under 
no obligation to do so. De la Cueva likens the situation to that of 
a tenant, who cannot evade payment of the rent by refusing to 
occupy the premises. He points out that no obligation upon the 
part of the employer to continue in business indefinitely is in-
volved. He can go out of business, and give the workers their legal 
indemnity. But while he continues in business he cannot deprive 
the workers of their rights. De la Cueva feels that "the enterprise 
is not merely an individual matter; the law of labor has risen 
above that epoch." 
Viewing the problem m the light of his social viewpoint, he 
continues: 
Discussion of the question has been somewhat useless. Jurists fre-
quently discuss matters superficially, without recurring to fundamental 
concepts. Subdivision 22 of Article 123 of the Constitution has 
brought into competition two concepts of the law of labor, one which 
attempts to confine it within the old individualistic ideas, and one 
which contemplates it as . a human law with social content. In the 
regime of capitalist production the rights of man are in conflict with 
the asserted rights of capital: the right to existence of the workers 
defends the principle of compulsory reinstatement; the caprices of 
capital defend the efforts to obstruct the natural consummation of 
Subdivision 22. Indeed, when Bismarck prohibited the formation of 
associations of workers, he affirmed in the Imperial Message that to the 
worker his present and his future are important; and such is the law 
of labor- it does not resign itself to considering only the present of 
the worker, and endeavors to give security to his future. 
Trueba feels that the present position of the court, "against 
obligatory reinstatement, is contrary to the basic spirit of Article 
123, to protect the workers, and that that spirit should prevail 
against technicalities."41 He says, further:42 
It is to be hoped that the court will return to the former jurisprudence, 
41 3 DERECHO PROCESAL DEL TRABAJO (1943) 449. For his discussion of the deci-
sions of the court: id., 443. See also his EL ARTICULO 123 (1943) 394. 
42 3 DERECHO PROCESAL DEL TRABAJO (1943) 450. 
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and that it will understand that it should not be restricted by the 
rigidity of the constitutional provisions in interpreting them, but that 
it should be guided by the objectives of the Constitution and the evo· 
lutionary currents which have succeeded in accomplishing systema· 
tization in the constant progress not only of the interests of the working 
class but also of the innate procedural discipline of labor in its scien· 
tific and cultural manifestations. 
Through the change of orientation of the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court, the option which the legislator sought to establish in favor of 
the worker has been converted into an option in favor of the employer. 
Between the purpose of the legislator and the import of the new juris-
prudential doctrine there is a world of ideas and thoughts in conflict. 
The amount of the indemnity required to be paid the discharged 
worker under various circumstances43 has caused many disputes, 
but is not significant for our purposes, since, as De la Cueva has 
pointed out,44 the necessity of making the payment has not suf-
ficed to deter employers from wrongfully discharging workers and 
refusing to reinstate them.45 It is then a natural question- why 
so many disputes, often carried on appeal to the Supreme Court? 
I would say that there are four reasons, any one or more of which 
43 1 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 813, 829; 
4 ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA, DERECHO PROCESAL DEL TRABAJO (1944) 369, Apendice 7, 
"Salarios Caidos en el Proceso por Despido lnjustificadg"; Constitution, Art 123, Sub-
divisions 21 and 22; Labor Law, §§ 122, 128, 601, 604. Among the decisions: Amp. 
Garcia Juan B., 59 S.J.F. 701 (1939); Amp. Agoitia Juan, 62 S.J.F. 2881 (1940); Amp. 
Gris Carlos M., 63 S.J.F. 2437 (1942) ; Amp. Rafael Perez Marquez, 84 S.J.F. 647 
(1945); Amp. Martha Llanos de Porras Moliner, 30 Revista del Trabajo 35 (1947, 
Num. 119); Amp. Cia. Manufacturers Driles y Lonas, S.A., id. at 39; Amp. Arturo 
Morgan y Emma Yanez, digested, 26 Los Tribunales 55 (1949); amparo discussed, 
"Pagos Legales de los Salarios Caidos," Mexico City Excelsior, January 17, 1949, p. 1; 
amparo discussed; "Aclara la Corte Jurisprudencia de Salarios Caidos," id., December 
24, 1949, p. 30; amparo against Board filed by La Perfeccionada, "Fallo Contrario a una 
Fabrica de Hilados," id., March 29, 1951, p. 19; Amp. El Salvador, "Distincion en 
Casos de Despido lnjusto," id., July 19, 1951, p. SA; Amp. Dominguez Jaime Gallegos, 
"Aconsejan Cautela a los Patronos al Rescindir los Contratos," id., July 21, 1951, 
p.5A. 
Technical questions of pleading have been involved. In the majority of cases the 
employer denies that the worker was discharged, making the burden of proof very 
important. 1 MARIO DE LA CuEVA, op. cit. supra at 834. 
44 1 DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 815, quoted supra at note 39. 
45 A newspaper report stated that eleven workers had been discharged by an ice 
plant in Tampico, and that the manager had paid the men their separation indemnities, 
totaling almost 9,000 pesos, in the presence of the Labor Board. "lndemnizacion a 
Trabajadores," Mexico City Excelsior, August 1, 1951, p. 4A. 
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may apply to a particular case: first, desire to avoid having to 
make the payment; second, endeavor to establish a precedent 
against having to make such payments in the future;46 third, desire 
to have public opinion on one's side; and fourth, pressure by the 
government to at least use the machinery of the Boards and the 
courts. 
It seems certain that the Constitution will be amended to pro-
vide effectively for compulsory reinstatement. The Chamber of 
Deputies of the National Congress has already almost unani-
mously taken action to that effect.47 • 
If the employer is to be prevented from wrongfully discharging 
a worker, a logical corollary would seem to be that the worker 
should be prevented from wrongfully leaving. This is a good illus-
tration of the general problems to what exent a legal system should 
recognize economic disparity. 
The Labor Law contains a long list of causes which justify dis-
charge of a worker/8 together with a catch-all provision for analo-
gous causes of equal seriousness and with similar consequences.49 
There is a corresponding list of acts of the employer which justify 
recission by the worker of the contract of employment.60 It is pro-
vided that the worker who quits without just cause is subject to 
eivilliability. 51 Unless he is difficult to replace, the damages would 
46 The civil law theory that judicial decisions are not precedents is not lived up to 
by the Mexicans, at least in the labor law field. In this aspect of their thinking they 
are thoroughly Americanized -loose leaf editions of the Labor Law are kept annotated 
down to date, and collections of digests of the decisions are published. A reversal of its 
position by the Supreme Court is given the same significance as with us. 
47 "Salvaguardia Contra el Cese de Trabajadores," Mexico City Excelsior, Novem-
ber 24, 1948, p. 1. · 
48 § 121; discussed: 1 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d 
ed. 1949) 599, 808; Cormack & Barker, The Mexican Labor Law, 7 So. Calif. L. Rev. 
251, 267 (1934). 
4 9 § 121 (6). Presumably this would cover any violation of the long lists of obliga-
tions and prohibitions set forth in §§ 113 and 114. 
Go § 123, including a similar catch-all provision, which presumably brings in viola-
tion of any of the obligations and prohibitions relating to employers in §§ 111 and 112. 
Discussed: 1 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d ed. 1949) 609, 
809; Cormack & Barker, The Me:;dcan Labor Law, 7 So. Calif. L. Rev. 251, 269 (1934). 
The worker is also entitled to three months' wages. § 124. 
51 §§ 38, 125. 
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seem to he nominal, and in any event enforcement of the liability 
against him would, of course, he problematical, particularly as 
wages can not he garnished.62 In view of the attitude of the Su-
preme Court toward obligatory reinstatement, as involving a 
deprivation of liberty, the constitutionality of the provision would 
seem to he douhtful.68 
An employee cannot he hired for a trial period, as this would 
lead to evasion of the provisions of the law in regard to dis-
charge.64 Nor can other forms of contracts for temporary employ· 
ment he used unless the work is by its nature temporary.66 On 
the other hand, a contract of employment may not extend for more 
than a year to the prejudice of the worker.66 
Possibly something of the spirit with which the Labor Law is 
being administered can he gathered from consideration of some 
of the cases which have arisen. In general, the results are not 
surpnsmg. 
Disobedience, within the meaning of the Law,67 relates to orders 
in the conduct of the business, and does not apply to a personal 
matter, such as, contrary to the wishes of the manager, requesting 
52§ 95. 
53 This would seem to be true notwithstanding the reference to the worker's civil 
liability for breach of contract in the final sentence of Article 5 of the Constitution. On 
the other hand, the severance payment required of the employer has been upheld. 
54 Amp. Juarez Enrique C. y coags., 67 S.J.F. 2058 (1941); Amp. Hernandez Alicia, 
August, 1950. Actual incompetency or inefficiency, or loafing, would seem to justify dis-
charge as a violation of the obligation, in § 113 (2), to work "diligently, carefully and 
with proper attention," and theoretically to call for the imposition of a small fine by the 
government under § 683. 1 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, 0ERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO (3d 
ed. 1949) 602. See also§§ 24(2), 126(9). 
55 §§ 24(3), 39, 126 (4, 5); Amp. Heredia Josey coags., "Garantia Juridica en los 
Contratos con Trabajadores,'' Mexico City Excelsior, June 14, 1951, p. 4A. For Board 
decisions prior to the present Labor Law: annotations to § 39 in Enrique Calderon's 
second edition of the Labor Law in 1931. · 
56 Constitution, Art. 5; Labor Law,§ 37. 
57§§ 113(1), 121(11). Among many decisions: Amp. Cia. de Tranvias de Luz y 
Fuerza Motriz de Monterrey, 45 S.J.F. 5668 (1937, decision 1935); Amp. Venegas Jose, 
56 S.J.F. 1451 (1939, decision 1938); Amp. Vera J. Raul, "Silos Obreros Desobedecen 
Ordenes del Patron, se les Cancela el Contrato," Mexico City Excelsior, May 21, 1951, 
p. llA. 
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the police to remove another employee who had been injuring 
and threatening the one discharged :58 
... This was not a matter of the work agreed upon, nor could it be, 
because it related to a matter eminently personal, involving personal 
dignity, which the worker does not, and should not, place in the hands 
of his employer. 
It is dishonesty justifying discharge59 when a worker sleeps on 
the job and negligently permits a tank of oil to overflow:60 
In effect, honesty signifies rectitude of conduct, fulfillment of duty, 
and it is evident that such a worker ... does not work with honesty, 
and, furthermore, that his conduct causes injury to his employer, 
when the worker collects wages without performing the duty for which 
he is obligated. Section 113(2) of the Labor Law places upon the 
worker the obligation to perform his duty with appropriate intensity, 
care and attention, and in the manner, time and place agreed, from 
which it results that disobedience of these precepts involves a lack of 
that which the law considers as obligation of the worker in fulfillment 
of his duty. 
In another case discharge was held justified when a watchman 
fell asleep on the job, and permitted himself to be robbed of his 
pistol.61 
The following were likewise held to be sufficient acts of dis-
honesty: failure to report to the employer or to the police alleged 
loss of money collected from customers ;62 working for a competi-
tor during a leave of absence granted upon a plea of illness;63 
faking an accident in order to secure workmen's compensation 
benefits;64 taking company lumber;65 taking company money;66 
and stealing freight being transported by employer railroad.67 
ss Amp. Gancedo Domingo, 71 S.J.F. 571, 573 (1942). 
59 § 121 (2). 
60 Amp. Cia. Mexicana de Petroleo "El Aguila," S.A., 48 S.J.F. 1685, 1689 (1937· 
1938, decision 1936). 
61 Amp. Pedroza Fidel, 64 S.J.F. 850 (1940). 
62 Amp. Reyna Herlinda, 62 S.J.F. 321 (1940, decision 1939). 
63 Amp. Garcia Alfredo, February 28, 1947, digested, 24 Los Tribunales 172 (1947). 
64 Amp. Costilla, 28 Los Tribunales 27 (1950). 
65 Amp. Cardona Manuel, 47 S.J.F. 699, 704 (1937, decision 1936). 
66 Amp. Ahedo Fernando, 37 S.J.F. 1615 (1935, decision 1933). 
67 Amp. Cabrera Ponciano, 42 S.J .F. 3655 (1936, decision 1934). 
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Drunkenness on the job justifies discharge, 68 but has caused 
many disputes. 69 Thus, it has been held that the drunkenness must 
be such as to endanger life or property, and that it is not sufficient 
that a physician testifies that the man had imbibed of alcohol, and 
had alcoholic breath, altered pulse and thick speech. 70 When a 
worker did not show up for work drunk, which the law expressly 
proscribes,71 but had his condition reported from his home, and 
it took him four days to recover, and the intoxication was not 
customary, this was held, by a divided court, to be an instance of 
vis major not justifying discharge. 72 
The law permits three unexcused absences without good reason 
during a month. 73 It is held that if a worker has good reason for 
an absence, he must report it before the time for work has arrived, 
otherwise it will be charged against him. 74 
Violence against coworkers which disturbs discipline is ex-
pressly forbidden.75 Discharge was held justified even though the 
disturbance was outside working hours, 76 and in another case 
when workers left a factory to assault another employee in the 
street. 77 A like result was reached when the one discharged had 
68 §§ 114(4)' 121(13). 
60 Among many cases, in addition to those discussed: Amp. Ferrocarriles Nacionales 
de Mexico, 43 S.J.F. 1214, 1217, 1218 (1935); Amp. Cortes Ildefonso, 45 S.J.F. 3170 
(1937, decision 1935); Amp. Sindicato de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros, 45 S.J.F. 5347 
(1937, decision 1935); Amp. Rivera Miguel, 49 S.J.F. 1965 (1938, decision 1936). 
70 Amp. Cia. Mexicana de Fosforos y Cerrillos "La Imperial," S.A., 64 S.J.F. 1439 
(1940). 
n §§ 114(4), 121(13). That it may be reasonable to require that this occur three 
times within a year, to justify discharge: Amp. Rendon Antonio, 81 S.J.F. 5661 (1944), 
digested, 21 Los Tribunales 356 (1944). 
72 Amp. Cias. Mexicana de Explosivos, S.A., y Mexicana de Mechas para Minas, 
S.A., "Faltar al Trabajo por Embriaguez no es Causa de Cese," Mexico City Excelsior, 
August 9, 1950, p. 4. 
78 §§ 114(2), 121(10). 
74 Amp. "Fermindez Hnos.", Seres., 62 S.J.F. 2586 (1940); Amp. Guzman Jesus 
Ramirez, 87 S.J.F. 1081 (1946). 
75 § 121(2, 3). 
76 Amp. Burgos Gandolfo Jose, 59 S.J.F. 2236 (1939). 
77 Amp. Colgate Palmolive Peet, S.A., 67 S.J.F. 981 (1941). Among other cases of 
violence justifying discharge: Amp. Sindicato de Ferrocarrileros de Ia Republica Mexi-
cana, 45 S.J.F. 4157 (1937, decision 1935); Amp. Valenzuela Juan, 61 S.].F. 3517 
(1940, decision 1939) ; Amp. Praxedis Puente F., 79 S.J.F. 303 (1944). 
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insulted other workers and they had requested his discharge: 78 
... In the spirit of protection of the workers, which rules all the labor 
legislation, injuries or bad treatment [by the discharged worker], 
whatever may be the circumstances, can never be justified, if it is borne 
in mind, furthermore, that only with a methodical system of work, 
based upon respect of the workers for each other and for their em-
ployer, is their task facilitated and their effort lessened. 
Acquittal in criminal proceedings is not binding upon the Labor 
Boards.79 
Destruction of company bulletins, the contents of which were 
already known to the employees, was not an act of sufficient im-
portance to justify discharge. 80 Workers can not be discharged be-
cause of intra-union troubles.81 Discharge is justified when the 
employer is called a gossip ("hablador") .82 Sabotage justified the 
discharge of seven miners.83 An accident while driving a bus jus-
tified discharge of the driver.84 A debt owed the employer could 
not justify discharge.85 A worker near retirement age who dis-
obeyed an order under the mistaken belief that a boiler was being 
cleaned in a dangerous manner should have been disciplined, and 
not discharged. 86 
The law provides that loss of confidence upon the part of the 
employer is ground for termination of the contract of employment 
78 Amp. United Shoe and Leather Co., S.A., 47 S.J.F. 1895, 1896 (1937, decision 
1936). 
79 Amp. Ferrocarriles Nacionales, "Tesis Juridica en Materia de Juicios Obrero," 
Mexico City Excelsior, September 7, 1950, p. 4. 
80 Amp. Ferrocarril Mexicano, "Romper Boletines no es Falta de Probidad," Mexico 
City Excelsior, October 9, 1950, p. 13. 
81 Amp. Diaz de Leon Guillermo y coags., 71 S.J.F. 564 (1942); Amp. Duesca Gabriel 
Marco, 30 Revista del Trabajo 37 (1947, Num. 119). 
82 Amp. Duarte Jose Jesus, 44 S.J.F. 4168 (1937, decision 1935). 
8S Amp. Trabajadores Mineros, Metalurgicos, y Similares de la Republica Mexicana, 
"Declara la Corte que es Licita la Destituci6n de Obreros Saboteadores," Mexico City 
Excelsior, March 6, 1951, p. 1. 
84 Amp. Arana Luis, 45 S.J.F. 667 (1937, decision 1935). 
8~ Amp. Rodriguez Cipriano, 49 S.J.F. 218 (1938, decision 1936). A contrary deci· 
sion would, of course, have been a step toward peonage. 
86 Amp. Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros de la Republica, 45 S.J.F. 5662 0937, decision 
1935). 
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of a worker in a managerial, fiscal or supervisory position. 87 It 
was held that faults of indolence and negligence upon the part of 
such an employee might merit disciplinary action, hut did not 
justify discharge.88 In another case the court said:89 
The loss of confidence, which the Board also considers a legitimate 
cause for the separation of the complainant, is something which can· 
not be made concrete by strict standards, for it depends, in large part, 
upon subjective causes the principal criterion for the evaluation of 
which is the good faith which should be mutual in the relations be-
tween employee and employer. In numerous decisions this court has 
established the principle that loss of confidence is a legitimate cause 
for termination of the contract only when it is founded upon sufficient 
reasons which, taking into consideration the situation of the employee, 
and the intimate bond which binds him to the interests of the em· 
ployer, merit his separation. 
The court therefore held that the requisite lack of confidence could 
not arise out of a personal dispute with another employee not con· 
nected with his work; nor from requesting an advance against his 
future salary; nor from a dispute with a higher official because 
the latter had, without notifying the discharged complainant, 
ordered a subordinate of the complainant to do work other than 
that which he had been ordered to do by the complainant. 
(Part II will appear in the next issue.) 
87 § 126 (10). If he had been promoted from a lower position, he is entitled to be 
restored to it unless there exists ground for discharge. I bid. A textbook decision: Amp. 
Cia. "Productos de Maiz," S.A., 64 S.J .F. 1192 (1940). 
88 Amp. Rodriguez Arnulfo, 49 S.J.F. ll63 (1938, decision 1936). 
8U Amp. Gancedo Domingo, 71 S.J.F. 571, 573 (1942). 
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